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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSO-
CIATION, a corporation, 
-vs.-
Plaintiff, 
CLINTON H ANDERSON, RUTH C. Mc-
OMBER, HARRY BERMAN, JOSEPH 
JERRY JEREMY and JACQUELINE 
JEREMY, his wife, ROBERT J. McRAE, 
MRS. ROBERT J. McRAE, his wife, 
CHARLES C. CHAFFEE, JR., and MRS. 
CHARLES C. CHAFFEE, JR., his wife, 
and 
HARRY BERMAN, 
Defendants. 
Cross-complainant and Appellant, 
-vs.-
JOSEPH JERRY JEREMY and JACQUE-
LINE JEREMY, his wife, 
Cross-defendants and Respondents. 
No. 9566 
BRIEF OF APPELL~T 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action wherein defendant and cross-com-
plainant, Harry Berman, seeks judgement against de-
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fendants and cross-defendants, Joseph Jerry Jeremy and 
Jacqueline Jeremy on a certain promissory note. 
DISPOSIT'ION IN LOvVER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court, sitting without a 
jury. The trial court found in favor of the said cross-
defendants and against the cross-complainant, no cause 
of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Cross-complainant seeks reversal of the judgment 
and for judgment against the cross-defendants, or a new 
trial. 
STAT'EJ\ifENT OF FACTS 
The original action was brought by the plaintiff, 
American Savings & Loan Association as first mortgage 
holder to foreclose its mortgage on real property located 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The cross-defendants had sold 
this residence property to defendant Ruth C. McOmber. 
A friend of McOmber, defendant ·Clinton H. Anderson, 
co-signed a note ·with :McOmber as part payment on this 
home and delivered the smne to cross-defendants Jeremy. 
Anderson and J\ifcOmber also each signed second mort-
gages to secure the note and delivered the same to the 
cross-defendants. 
Cross-complainant, Harry Berman, owned a home 
in Salt Lake City which he listed for sale with Bettilyons, 
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real estate brokers (Tr. 44). The contract with Bettilyons 
provided for a multiple listing of the property (Tr. 148). 
The defendants Jeremy were searching for a home to 
purchase (Tr. 122). A sales lady for Holt-Webber Real 
Estate Agency interested the Jeremys in the Berman 
home and made arrangements for Mrs. Jeremy to see the 
home. After Mrs. Jeremy had examined the premises, 
she later returned with her husband to see the Berman 
home. They liked the home and told their sales lady that 
if Berman would accept the $4500.00 note that theiJ had 
received from Anderson and McOmber as partial down 
payment, they would buy the Berman home (Tr. 7 and 
123). Negotiations between the parties for the sale of 
the Berman home were handled by the Holt-Webber 
Agency (Tr. 8 and 123). The necessary documents for 
closing the sale were prepared by this same broker (T·r. 
8). The real estate broker delivered the $4500.00 note to 
Berman as part of the down payment (Tr. 9). At this 
time, the note was payable to the order of the J eremys 
and had not been endorsed (Exhibit 1, Tr. 13, and 198). 
Together with the note, and by separate instrument, 
Berman received Exhibit D and CP-5 which is an assign-. 
ment of the note in question. The J eremys claim they did 
not wish to be bound personally on the note and conveyed 
this information to Sterling vVebber, a partner in the 
Holt-vVebber Real Estate Agency (Tr. 198). Webber 
acknowledged having a conversation with the J eremys 
concerning endorsement of the note but could not remem-
ber ever relaying this information to Berman (Tr. 157, 
161, 165-167). Berman denied ever having discussed the 
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matter of endorsement with anyone before or at the time 
ofsale (T'r. 259 and 260). 
Several months after the J eremys took possession of 
the Berman home, they were contacted by Berman and 
asked if he could come to their home and have the note 
endorsed by them. Mr. J eren1y told him that because of 
a previous engagement they would have to delay the meet-
ing to the following day. Berman and his wife came to 
the Jeremy home with the note in question and requested 
the Jeremy to endorse the note. :.Mr. Jeremy went to a 
telephone in another room and contacted his attorney to 
inquire about signing the note, and was told to endorse 
the note without recourse which he and Mrs. Jeremy then 
did (Tr.13 and 14, 200, 201). 
The holder of the first mortgage on the hon1e the 
J eremys sold, sued to foreclose the mortgage and named 
the J eremys and Berman as defendants by virtue of the 
second mortgages given by Anderson and :11c0mber and 
assigned to Berman. 
The negotiations for the sale of the Berman home, 
together with the preparation of the necessary documents 
for sale were handled by the Holt-\V ebber real estate 
agency with the knowledge of the J eremys and Berman 
(Tr. 7, 8, 30, 31, 32, 260, 123, 15-±, 158, 16-±). Neither of 
the J ere1nys ever talked with Bern1an concerning the 
transaction and the assignment of the $4500.00 note (Tr. 
140, 237), except they represented to Berman that the 
$4500.00 note was as good as gold (Tr. 193, 201, 203, 204, 
243, 244). The J eremys never told the real estate broker 
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how to arrange for transfer of the note but left the entire 
matter in the hands of the broker (T'r. 236). When Ber-
man presented the note to them for their endorsement 
they did not tell him that they did not wish to be bound on 
the note but endorsed it "without recourse" after talking 
with their attorney by telephone ( Tr. 200). 
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL 
I. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN UNQUALI-
FIED ENDORSEMENT FROM THE RESPONDENTS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
II. APPELLANT WAS NOT BOUND BY THE UNDIS-
CLOSED COLLATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
JEREMYS AND THEIR REAL ESTATE BROKER. 
III. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BERMAN 
AGREED TO ACCEPT A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT ON 
THE NOTE. 
ARGUl\iENT 
I. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN UNQUALI-
FIED ENDORSEMENT FROM THE RESPONDENTS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The note transferred by the Jeremys to Berman had 
not been endorsed at the time of the transfer and Berman 
could later require their endorsement. Title 44-1-50, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows: 
''Where the holder of an instrument payable 
to his order transfers it for value without endors-
ing it, the transfer vests in the transferee such 
title as the transferor had therein; and the trans-
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feree acquires, in addition, the right to have the 
endorsement of the transferor ... " 
This statute conforms to the negotiable instruments law. 
It has been uniformly held by this court, and courts of 
other jurisdictions, that the transferee is entitled to an 
unqualified endorsement. In the case of Ackerman vs. 
Bramwell Investment Company, et al, 80 Utah 52, 12 
Pac. 2d 623, wherein the defendant transferred a note 
payable to the defendant and accompanied the delivery 
of the unendorsed note by a separate agreement of assign-
ment, assigning all the right, title and interest in the note 
to the plaintiff, this court held that the assignment, being 
contemporaneous with the transfer and purchase of the 
note will, with its transfer and delivery, he regarded as 
an endorsement. 
In the case of Pritchard vs. Strike, et al, 66 Utah 394, 
243 Pac. 114, this court stated at page 402 : 
orbit 
"Thus we think that one endorsing a negoti-
able promissory note and desiring to disclaim 
the responsiblity of an endorser must, by appro-
priate words, clearly indicate such an intention 
or an intention to be bound in some other capacity, 
and that he does not do so by language as here 
assigning and delivering all his right, title and 
interest in the note, which is nothing more than 
what the law implies from a blank or general 
endorsement without words creating the implica-
tion, and hence is but the expression of a clause 
which t.he law implies, and works nothing.'' 
This matter is discussed in an annotation in 87 ALR, 
at page 1189, wherein the author states: 
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"In accordance with the provisiOns of 49 
of the Act, it is unifonnly held that one taking 
a negotiable instrument by transfer without en-
dorsement is entitled to have the endorsement 
of his trensferor and that he may compel such 
endorsement by legal process. It also appears to 
be the rule that, in the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary, the transferee is entitled to an 
unqualified endorsement; and that such endorse-
men may be compelled although the instrument 
was taken after maturity." 
,gee also Lawrence vs. Citizen's State Bank (Kan-
sas), 113 l{an. 724, 216 Pac. 262, wherein the court held 
that a transferee was entitled to an unqualified endorse-
ment, stating that an endorsement without recourse was 
unacceptable. In accord, se.e Queensboro National Bank 
of the City of New York vs. Kelly, 48 Fed. 2d 57 4. 
In the case of 1\iiller vs. Shelby County Investment 
Company, 30 S. W. 2d 668, the court therin held that 
an agreement to transfer a note is prima facie an agree-
ment to transfer in the usual way by endorsement. 
Other courts have eonsidered the effect of trans-
ferring a note by separate assignment. In the ease of 
Parr vs. Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Company, 100 Florida 
941, 130 Southern 445, at page 44 7, the eourt stated: 
"The· fact that she accepted an assignment 
by a separate written instrument does not evidence 
an agreement upon her part to accept a qualified 
endorsement." 
The facts in the Parr case showed that the plaintiff 
purchased several promiss-ory notes from the defendant 
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bank. The bank transferred the notes to the plaintiff 
by a separate document of assignment but did not en-
dorse the notes. The makers of the notes defaulted 
and plaintiff sought an unqualified endorsement from 
the bank, which was refused. The court in discussing 
the matter said at page 448 : 
''If at the time of the transfer the parties 
are silent upon the subject of endorsement, then 
the law implies an agreement by the transferor 
to endorse a negotiable instrument when it is 
made payable to his orde·r.'' 
In the case of Lawrence vs. Citizen's State Bank, M.an-
hatten, et al, Supra, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in 
discussing the reference of the. negotiable instruments 
law to qualified endorsements stated: 
"Such an endorsement is not to be inferred; 
a restricted endorsement is necessarily the result 
of some express or implied understanding, and, 
when that is wanting, the right to an endorsement 
without any qualifications is one which the statute 
confers on the transferee. Otherwise, it was 
hardly worthwhile for the legislature to say any-
thing about it." 
This court went onto say that the burden of proving 
the agreement was on the transferor. 
The evidence in our instant case clearly shows that 
the respondents never informed the ap!)ellant that they 
were not to be bound or liable on the note (Tr. 140, 
200, 201, 237, 259, and 260). Appellant respectfully 
submits that the trial court erred in refusing to require 
the J eremys to give an unqualified endorsement of the 
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note as there wm; no language of limitation in the 
assignment of the note at the time of its transfer to 
appellant Berman (Ex. D and CP5), and admittedly 
they never talked to him. 
II. APPELLANT WAS NOT BOUND BY THE UNDIS-
CLOSED COLLATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
JEREMYS AND THEIR REAL EST ATE BROKER. 
The record is clear that Webber, the real estate 
broker handling the transaction, was acting in a dual 
capacity as agent for all parties ( Tr. 7, 8, 30, 31, 3:2, 
123, 154, 158, 164, 197 and 260). In real estate trans-
actions, this situation has been considered by the courts. 
In the case of Fuchs vs. Leahy, 321 Missouri 47, 9 S.W. 
2d 897, the court held : 
"Where two or rnore principals. employ the 
same agent, whether as a means of dealing with 
one another or to protect their common interests, 
one cannot charge the other not actually at fault 
·with the misconduct of the combination ... There 
is no reason why the misconduct of the agent 
should be imputed to one principal rather than 
to the other." 
See 2 :Meacham on Agency, Second Edition, Section 2140. 
The courts considering the problem of a real estate 
agent acting on behalf of the buyer and the seller with 
the knowledge of both, have concluded that the acts of 
the agent and his misconduct should not be imputed to 
either party. The courts follow the rule that where 
a common agent conceals something, the party damaged 
can recover where the party benefiting has accepted 
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and obtained the advantage even though he did not 
authorize or know of the concealment. See Owens vs. 
Schneider, 85 Pac. 2d 198 ; also lierdan vs. Hanson, 
182 Gal. 5·38, 189 Pac. 440. 
Where the agent fraudulently misrepresents the 
transaction to the detriment of the buyer and benefit 
of the seller, the parties will be held free of the acts 
of the agent and the courts will not allow the buyer to 
benefit nor the seller to suffer the loss. 
In our instant case, the J eremys testified that they 
did not instruct 1N ebber, their real estate broker, to 
prepare any particular form of transfer of the note, 
but left the entire matter to his discretion (Tr. 202, 
203 and 236). Berman also testified that he was relying 
upon the integrity and advice of the broker and· was 
never at any time notified by vV ebber that the J eremys 
did not wish to be bound on the note (Tr. 259 and 260). 
Under this factual situation, it appears clear that 
the failure of Webber to disclose all the facts to Berman 
should not work to the disadvantage of Berman. By 
virtue of the authorities cited above, the lower court 
should have required the J eremys to be bound on the 
note given by them as part of the purchase price of the 
property. To deprive Berman of the endorsement, the 
lower court must necessarily violate the general rule 
and thereby allow the J eremys to take advantage of 
the broker's conceahnent to the detrin1ent of Berman. 
If the court were to require the J eremys to endorse 
the note and be liable thereon, it would be doing nothing 
10 
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more than Inaking them pay the full value for the home, 
which was the purchase price agreed upon. Respondents 
admit that they never told appellant of their desire not 
to be liable on the note. The evidence is clear and 
unequivocal that at no ti1ne did either Mr. and Mrs. 
J ermny ever tell Berman that they did not wish to be 
bound personally on the note. They told Berman that 
the note was as good as gold, and urged him to accept 
it as part of the downpayment on the purpchase price. 
Even after Berman received the note and the separate 
assignment thereof, nothing was ever said to hi1n by 
the real estate broker or the J eremys concerning their 
desire not to be bound. Mrs. Jeremy testified that when 
Berman called their home and requested tha.t they en-
dorse the note she could not understand why he had 
waited so long to ask for the endorsement (T'r. 140). 
Mr. Jeremy stated that he had been contacted by Berman 
requesting an endorsement on the note and that because 
of a previous engagement, he asked Berman con1e to 
his home the following evening for the endorsement. 
When Bern1an arrived with the note, no discussion was 
ever had wherein the J eremys stated their alleged posi-
tion of not \Vishing to be bound on the note. Instead, 
:Jlr. Jeremy decided to call his attorney on the telephone 
to ask his advice about endorsing the note and sub-
sequently endorsed the same without recourse (Tr. 200-
201). 
At this time, the Jeremys were given a perfect 
opportunity to clarify any misunderstanding concern-
ing their liability on the note but they did not chose 
11 
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to do so. The Jeremys' silence at this point clearly 
indicates that there never was any agreement between 
themselves and Berman that they should not be person-
ally bound on the note. 
In 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, at page 479, the author 
states: 
"Silence frequently speaks with· more decis-
iveness and eloquence than the clearest of human 
actions. Hence, if a statement is made in the 
presence of a person, in regard to facts affecting 
his rights, and he makes no reply, his silence may 
be construed as a tacit admission of the facts 
stated ... " 
In the case of Casey vs. Burns (Illinois), 129 N.E. 
2d 440, 54 ALR 2d 1060, at page 1066, the ~ourt stated: 
''Admissions may be implied from conduct 
as well as expressed by words, and may sometimes 
be implied from mere silence where there is an 
opportunity to act or speak and where the circum-
stances properly and naturally call for action 
or reply from men similarly situated." 
It appears clear to us that had there been any such 
understanding as claimed by the J eremys, they would 
have immediately informed Berman that they had no 
intention of endorsing the note and that their position 
in this matter had been previously discussed and agreed 
upon. This was never done. The testimony further shows 
that Berman was relying upon the J eremys as guaran-
tors of the note and that the real estate agent, Webber, 
obtained a credit report on the Jeremys to determine if 
they could meet their obligations under the proposed 
12 
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sale (Tr. 167). If, in fact, the Jeremys did actually 
discuss this problem with the real estate broker, his 
failure to relay such discussion to Berman was a breach 
of his duty to all parties and neither should be permitted 
to take advantage of the situation as it would then 
appear obvious that the broker, fearing his sales com-
mission was in jeopardy, concealed the matter from 
Berman. 
III. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BERMAN 
AGREED TO ACCEPT A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT ON 
THE NOTE. 
In paragraph 8 of the trial court's Findings of 
Fact, it states that defendants Jeremy had refused to 
endorse or guarantee the note (R. 92). The court made 
no finding that this refusal was ever conveyed to Ber-
man. The record is clear that Bennan and the Jeremys 
never discussed the question of endorsement of the note 
prior to its being transferred (Tr. 140, 237, 259 and 260). 
The cases previously cited uniformly hold that where 
there has been no agreement between the parties con-
cerning an endorsement, the law implies a ri~ht to 
an unqualified endorsement. An agreement between the 
parties would necessarily imply a meeting of the minds. 
If, as conceded by the J eren1ys, they never advised Ber-
man of their intention not to be bound upon the note, 
there could not have been an agree1nent betwen the 
parties and Berman would be entitled to an unqualified 
endorsement on the note, as a matter of law. The court's 
Findings of Fact in paragraph 8 referred to above was 
13 
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merely a conclusion evidencing the intention of the 
J eremys but in no way reflects an agreement between 
the parties. The most that can be said is that there 
was a mutual mistake of fact as between the parties, 
and neither should be allowed to profit under these 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the J eremys should be 
required to pay the note for $4500.00 which was given 
to Berman as partial down payment on the home they 
purchased. It would be 1nanifestly unjust to allow the 
J eremys to receive credit for this amount on the pur-
chase price but not guarantee the note without an express 
agreement from Berman to do otherwise. The record 
is clear and shows without qualification that the J eremys 
and Berman never discussed the rights of the parties 
concerning the note. Absent a clear agreement to the 
contrary, Berman is entitled to an unqualified endorse- . 
ment on the note as a matter of law. 
1The trial court's Findings of Fact manifest no such 
agreement but at best merely reflect an elusive state 
of mind on the part of the Jeremys at the time of the 
transaction. In order to relieve them fron1 responsibility 
on the note, there must he a clear finding that the 
parties had so agreed. The evidence shows no such 
agreement. 
We respectfully urge that in accordance with the 
pre-trial order entered by the court on May 11, 1961, 
14 
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that appellant Berman is entitled to judgment in his 
favor against the respondents Jeremy, for the sum 
of $5,346.64, which amount includes the principal sum 
due upon said promissory note (Exhibit D and CPl), 
interest, attorney fees and court costs, which said aggre-
gate amount was conceded by all parties to be due 
appellant Berman in the event he prevailed in this 
action. 
Unfortunately, the value of the real property fore-
closed by plaintiff is not of sufficient amount to satisfy 
the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff on its first 
mortgage, and therefore appellant Berman's only re-
course on said promisS"ory note is to pursue his recovery 
against the J eremys as respondents herein. 
We feel the trial court further erred in concluding 
that Berman's note and mortgage was not second in 
priority but in view of the value of the real property fore-
closed by plaintiff, this question of priority between Ber-
man and cross-defendants McRae and Chaffee becomes 
moot and of no avail to Berman. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE, and 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
of 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
Attorneys for Cross-complainant 
and Appellant 
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